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Faculty and Deans

RE-DEFINING REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING
OF LIBERTY. By Dorothy Roberts. New York: Pantheon Books, 1997. 312
pp. $26.00 (cloth).
Reproductive freedom is at the heart of women's equality. Women who
cannot control when they will conceive and how many children they will
have cannot be free and equal participants in family, social, political and
economic life. Nor can they take advantage of the equal rights women
have won in the courts and the legislatures. Without reproductive autonomy, guarantees of equality elsewhere are illusory.
America has a long and deplorable history of oppressing and abusing
women's right to control their reproductive destiny. For years, proscription of abortion forced women to rely on dangerous and even life-threatening procedures. While restrictions on abortion forced women to carry
pregnancies to term, other practices such as irreversible surgical sterilization, restrictive welfare policies and even criminal punishment have
been implemented to ensure that women-especially poor women-do
not become pregnant in the first place. Not until Griswold v. Connecticut
in 1965 did the Supreme Court first protect women's reproductive freedom by invalidating an archaic Connecticut criminal law that prohibited
the mere use of birth control. 1 The Court's 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade,
which provided a constitutional guarantee of a woman's right to choose
abortion, emerged from a long and remarkable battle to include a right
to sexual privacy among Americans' individualliberties.2
Volumes have been written about women's epic-and ongoing-struggle to carve a sphere of privacy that places bedroom and womb beyond
the reach of government.3 By and large, the story is portrayed as one of
women's triumph over governmental control of their bodies and their
conceptions of morality: women have, after all, "won" the "right" to use
contraceptives and to choose abortion (at least within the Roe framework).4 Of course, from the moment of victory, the "victors" in these
1 Griswold

v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).

z Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
3 See, e.g., DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE (1994).
4 One strand of late 20th-century feminism rejects the idea that the availability of
contraception and abortion has contributed to a more liberated female sexuality, arguing
rather that heterosexual relations are by definition oppressive in a society where genders
are unequal and that legal abortion enhances women's vulnerability to sexual coercion
by men. See, e.g., ANDREA DWORKIN, RIGHT-WING WOMEN 77-100 (1983); CATHARINE
A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 93-102 (1987).
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battles have been looking over their shoulders, always acutely aware that
their victories are hard-fought, narrowly won and constantly in danger
of being overturned or denigrated by conservative courts and legislatures.5 Nevertheless, most Americans view reproductive autonomy and
privacy generally as resting on firm ground now that landmark cases
such as Griswold and Roe are part of our constitutional pantheon.
For Dorothy Roberts, however, the traditional concept of reproductive
autonomy that centers on the right to use contraception and choose
abortion is far too narrow. In Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty, Roberts explores what she perceives
as a stark racial divide in the struggle for women's reproductive rights,
a fault line that was formed early in America's history when slave
owners forcibly bred, raped and otherwise exploited their female enslaved persons with the explicit approbation of law. Roberts chides
feminists for tacitly adopting a narrow view of reproductive freedom and
failing to address the myriad reproductive concerns of Black women. In
Roberts's view, the history of the movement for reproductive autonomy
has literally been whitewashed. While most middle- and upper-class
white women may be content with the sexual and reproductive rights
they have won, Roberts charges that Black women, whose use of contraceptives often has been written into law as an affirmative duty, are
hardly beneficiaries of the movement for reproductive freedom. Rather,
legal, societal and political barriers continue to prevent Black women
from fully exercising their reproductive freedom. According to Roberts,
Black women in America continue to experience the litany of horribles
that the battle for reproductive freedom has eradicated for white womenincluding such degrading practices as mandatory sterilization.
Roberts believes that "[w]e are in the midst of an explosion of rhetoric
and policies that degrade Black women's reproductive decisions." (p. 3)
In chapters focusing on new birth control methods ushered in by technological advances, welfare proposals conditioning receipt of benefits on
a woman's use of contraception, laws prohibiting federal funding for
abortions, and criminal prosecutions of drug-addicted mothers for child
5

The 25 years since Roe v. Wade have seen a constant barrage of anti-abortion
legislation designed to circumvent Supreme Court rulings. These laws have, for the most
part, been struck down, generating a new round of legislation and a new round of
litigation. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)
(holding that statutes giving third parties veto power over a woman's decision to choose
abortion were unconstitutional); Co1autti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979) (striking down
statute proscribing abortions when the fetus is or "may be" viable on void-for-vagueness
grounds). In recent decisions, the Supreme Court has upheld significant restrictions on
the right to abortion, and a plurality of the Court has indicated that it would abandon
the trimester system of Roe. See Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490
(1989) (upholding bar on state employees performing abortions and bar on the use of
public facilities for performing abortions, even when the patient pays for the abortion
herself).
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abuse, Roberts examines how modem reproductive policies threaten to
shackle Black women to the degraded images of Black motherhood that
have burdened their exercise of reproductive autonomy since the colonial
period.
Roberts sets out to establish and explore the intersection between race
and reproduction in order to change our conception of reproductive
freedom. She urges us to see reproductive freedom as a matter of social
justice, not merely of individual choice. Roberts notes that decisions
regarding reproduction are made in a social context characterized by,
among other things, substantial economic and educational inequalities.
In Roberts's view, the harm from restrictive welfare laws and criminal
prosecutions-which, she notes, disproportionately affect Black womenis not simply the incursion on each Black woman's decision-making.
Rather, such laws also diminish the value of Black motherhood, which
is in tum "a badge of racial inferiority worn by all Black people." (p.
310) In other words, the personal is political. 6
According to Roberts, "[r]eproductive politics in America inevitably
involves racial politics." (p. 9) Roberts seeks to link modem racial
politics directly to the American historical backdrop of control and
manipulation of Black women's bodies by both private individuals and
government actors. To explore this bridge to the past, Roberts chooses
as her vehicles of instruction several current reproductive policies that
have sparked considerable debate. According to Roberts: "Highlighting
the racial dimensions of contemporary debates such as welfare reform,
the safety of Norplant, public funding of abortion, and the morality of
new reproductive technologies is like shaking up a kaleidoscope and
taking another look." (p. 6) By "taking another look" at reproductive
freedom through provocative, racially-sensitive lenses, Roberts hopes to
re-define the meaning of reproductive freedom to take into account its
relationship to racial oppression.
Peeking into Roberts's freshly "shaken" kaleidoscope requires that we
re-examine the significance of birth control to women's reproductive
freedom. For most white women, access to birth control signifies a
significant step toward individual autonomy and self-definition and is an
integral aspect of privacy. However, Roberts notes that for Black women,
the historical regulation of their childbearing to achieve certain social
objectives largely overshadows whatever autonomy they might have gained
by their access to birth control. Slavery "marked Black women from the
beginning as objects whose decisions about reproduction should be subject to social regulation rather than to their own will." (p. 23) Roberts
contends that the birth control and eugenic movements of the early
6 See CATHARINE

(1989).

A.

MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE
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1900s picked up where slavery left off, with some advocates in those
movements calling for the reduction, if not the complete elimination, of
certain races and ethnicities in order to improve society. Since the early
1900s, contraception and its more sinister cousin, surgical sterilization,
have been used not to free Black women to pursue their goals and
dreams, but deliberately to limit their procreation.7
According to Roberts, the false assumption underlying the often inhumane regulation of Black women's reproduction is that procreation, and
not political, social and economic forces, is the cause of Blacks' condition in this country. She states: "America's recent eugenic past should
serve as a warning of the dangerous potential inherent in the notion that
social problems are caused by reproduction and can be cured by population control." (p. 59) Roberts explains that white myths and stereotypes concerning Black motherhood have long been used to justify white
control of Black women's reproductive decisions. Images of Black women
as unwed mothers, welfare queens, mammies and Jezebels, manufactured
in popular culture and academic circles, have branded Black women as
unfit for motherhood in whites' eyes and have been used by whites to
justify the regulation of every aspect of Black women's fertility. In
Roberts's opinion, today's lawmakers continue to craft reproductive policies with these stereotypes in mind. They have, in Roberts's view, utterly
failed to heed the lessons of the past.
Roberts correctly notes the fallacy that Black reproduction is the sole
cause of Blacks' social problems and that population control can miraculously cure those problems. Policies designed to reduce the number of
babies born to welfare mothers, for example, may ultimately reduce the
strain on the public budget to some degree, but pinning the blame for
Blacks' social condition on Black fertility rates alone demonstrates a
short-sighted and pernicious penchant for scapegoating and a failure to
appreciate the magnitude and complexity of the problems that must be
solved if Blacks are to experience equality in the exercise of reproductive and other freedoms.
It is equality, not liberty, with which Roberts is ultimately concerned.
Roberts finds the traditional view of liberty-that individuals should be
able to make choices free from governmental interference 8-entirely
wanting when it comes to reproductive freedom, particularly for Black
women. According to Roberts, this construct of liberty as a "negative
right" (p. 309) masks social prejudices and the maldistribution of wealth
7 Roberts places Margaret Sanger, the strongest feminist advocate for birth control in
the early part of the century, under fire for her eventual alliance with certain eugenic
interests. However, Roberts ultimately dismisses the charge that Sanger was a racist: "It
appears that Sanger was motivated by a genuine concern to improve the health of the
poor mothers she served rather than a desire to eliminate their stock." (p. 81)
8 See, e.g., ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR EsSAYS ON LIBERTY 121-31 (1969).
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and education. It allows, and may even encourage, the coercion of Black
women in their reproductive decision-making by concealing the racist
origins of social practices that, while not overtly discriminatory on the
basis of race, disproportionately deny Black women's reproductive freedom. Roberts advocates a group identity approach to reproductive freedom that is concerned with social harms as well as individual choice.
She does not wish to abandon negative liberty altogether; it does, after
all, protect against the abuse of government power and stress the value
of self-definition, which are both critical to overcoming a history of
denigration of Black women. However, Roberts clearly supports the
primacy of equality over liberty. Roberts's ultimate goal is to "ensure
the equal distribution of procreative resources in society." (p. 296)
Roberts advances "a notion of reproductive freedom that combines the
values captured by both liberty and equality." (p. 305) Like other feminist scholars, she prefers a notion of positive liberty to the negative
liberty that has allowed inequalities to flourish. She defines positive
liberty rather loosely as "the affirmative duty of government to protect
the individual's personhood from degradation and to facilitate the processes of choice and self-determination." 9 (p. 309) For example, instead
of prosecuting poor Black women for drug and child abuse, Roberts
argues that the government should provide them with subsistence benefits,
drug treatment and medical care. This assistance, in Roberts's view, is
the minimum required for "reproductive justice." (p. 311) Thus, reproductive justice, as Roberts sees it, is achievable only through the pursuit
of reproductive and sexual rights that are grounded not in a negative
right of privacy, but in a positive concept of self-determination, rooted
in equal justice and requiring social and economic support. Roberts
would not lay the duty of supporting positive liberty solely at the doorstep of the government; she deems private actors equally responsible for
distributing-or redistributing-the wealth of reproductive resources.
Much can be gained from Roberts's approach. Roberts's exploration
of reproductive oppression during slavery and the eugenic movement of
the early 1900s certainly provides ample reason to view with skepticism
any public policies that seek to incorporate birth control as a stick to
force compliance with government mandates. As Roberts convincingly
demonstrates, poor women, who have little choice in the matter, have
been beaten with such sticks for years. Roberts opens our eyes to a world
in which access to contraception does not necessarily enhance reproduc9 Other scholars have espoused the concept of positive liberty. See, e.g., Rhonda
Copelan, Losing the Negative Right of Privacy: Building Sexual and Reproductive
Freedom, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 15 (1990). It gained substantial momentum
as a result of the post-Roe attacks on abortion rights and Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986) (upholding, at least as to homosexual sodomy, a Georgia statute making all
sodomy criminal).

332

Harvard Women's Law Journal

[Vol. 21

tive freedom. In fact, for women dependent upon public assistance who
"choose" to use contraception under the threat of loss of benefits or
imprisonment, reproductive freedom is only an elusive dream. Roberts
is surely correct that the lives of these women, who are disproportionately Black, are shaped by a constellation of factors: psychological,
sociological, physiological and economic. Until they gain access to education, improved medical care and some level of subsistence benefits,
equality will undoubtedly remain illusory. 10
While these truths are incontestable, other aspects of Roberts's approach are not. She claims to be shaking up a kaleidoscope to offer a
fresh look at reproductive freedom. Kaleidoscopes are, of course, characterized by endlessly changing colors and patterns. Roberts, on the
other hand, sees only black and white and a single unceasing patternthe use by whites of myths and stereotypes to justify their control over
Black women's reproductive decisions. Roberts decries the use by some
lawmakers of rhetoric to advance their views and policies. Unfortunately, Roberts sometimes falls victim to her own criticism, unleashing
her own "explosion of rhetoric" (p. 3) and recognizable catch-phrases in
an attempt to shock us into seeing her point. 11 Roberts invokes the dark
specter of Nazism and "racial genocide" 12 (p. 21) as lurking behind
coercive welfare policies and criminal punishment of crack-abusing moth·
ers. She wants us to see "how the denial of Black reproductive autonomy
serves the interests of white supremacy." (p. 5) She speaks of the "torture" (p. 122) of Black women's bodies and characterizes restrictive
American welfare policies and proposals to encourage poor women to
use advances in birth control technology as schemes in a "worldwide
effort to reduce dark-skinned populations." (p. 143) Placed in Roberts's
newly "shaken" but rather deliberately arranged kaleidoscope, birth control itself appears not as a positive step toward women's autonomy, but
rather as a weapon being used in a race war with world-wide implications.

loJ See ROSALIND PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHOICE: THE STATE, SEXUAL•
ITY AND REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM 390 (2d ed. 1990).
11 Roberts does not shy away from stereotypes either. She appears to believe that the
beliefs of "most" white Americans' concerning welfare were formed by reading conservative scholars such as Charles Murray (p. 113), that Meg Ryan's performance in the
movie When a Man Loves a Woman helped to establish white Americans' vision of drugand alcohol-abusing white mothers (p. 179), and that the popularity among whites of
surrogate parenting soared after an episode of the Phil Donahue Show featured a
blond-haired, blue-eyed baby (pp. 270-71). While these stereotypes do not begin to
replicate the cruelty or harm of the stereotypes historically created by popular culture
and fastened to Black women, they tend to undermine Roberts's arguments and her
credibility.
12 Roberts notes "a deep suspicion in the minds of many Black Americans that
white-dominated family-planning programs are a form of racial genocide." (p. 21)
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The evidence Roberts presents to demonstrate such overt racism often
falls far short of her rhetorical charges. Take Norplant, the contraceptive
device that consists of five matchstick-sized capsules implanted in a
woman's arm that deliver contraceptive hormones continuously over a
five-year period. According to Roberts, racial politics created Norplant,
which she calls the "latest threat to reproductive autonomy." (p. 105)
Roberts's evidence of eugenic and racist motivations for the creation and
distribution of Norplant is exceedingly thin. Relying principally on allegations made by plaintiffs in class action complaints, Roberts pronounces
that "Norplant may be hazardous to your health," and she claims that
Norplant amounts to "torture" of Black women because it pumps "dangerous hormones" into their bodies. (p. 122) Yet Roberts herself points
out that Norplant utilizes "the same type of progestin used in some birth
control pills" (p. 105) and "can cause the same long list of bodily
disruptions as the pill." (p. 122) Is the pill, therefore, also a form of
torture? Roberts also brands the Population Council, which developed
Norplant, a racist organization because, according to Roberts, it is "closely
linked" (p. 141) with the eugenic movement. What is Roberts's basis for
suggesting that the Population Council and the eugenic movement are
closely linked? Forty-five years ago, the Population Council's president
supported eugenics. What has occurred, and who has presided, at the
Population Council since the 1950s seem not to concern Roberts at all.
Consider also Roberts's evidence concerning the following issues:
restrictive policies aimed at public health clinics, coercive welfare proposals that seek to encourage or even mandate the implantation of Norplant, and criminal child-abuse prosecutions that condition a woman's
freedom on the use of contraceptives. In 1988, the Department of Health
and Human Services issued regulations prohibiting federally funded family
planning clinics from advising patients that abortion is one of their
options. Roberts charges that this so-called "Gag Rule" violates the
autonomy of patients who rely on public clinics, patients who are disproportionately Black women. But as Roberts correctly notes, in 1993
President Clinton revoked the Gag Rule by executive order. Roberts also
concedes that, to date, no proposed legislation offering bonuses to welfare mothers for the use of Norplant or mandating Norplant implantation
or other birth control as a condition of receiving benefits has generated
sufficient support to be enacted into law. While some women who abuse
drugs during their pregnancies have been ordered as a condition of
probation in criminal cases to have Norplant inserted, courts of appeals
uniformly have rejected this form of punishment. 13 Roberts also admits
that she cannot determine from any available data the number of women13 Roberts notes: "No appellate court has ever upheld the imposition of any form of
birth control as a condition of probation." (p. 195)
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or, presumably, the number of Black, Hispanic or white women-who
have been forced as a condition of probation to have Norplant inserted.
The available data indicates only that, "[o]f four defendants ordered to
use Norplant within its first year on the U.S. market, all were on welfare
and three were nonwhite." (p. 196) This statistically irrelevant sample
is not convincing proof of an overtly racist motivation behind forced
Norplant implantation. Indeed, it tells us only that women who are poor
have suffered the indignity of being told that they must not conceive any
children for five years on pain of incarceration.
Roberts's historical and anecdotal evidence concerning the application
of restrictive welfare and reproductive policies generally supports the
notion that poor women of all races have been victimized. 14 As Roberts
points out throughout the book, what makes such policies and punish~
ments politically palatable is not only the race of the women affected,
but also their poverty and marital status. For example, Roberts claims
that crack mothers are penalized "because the combination of their
poverty, race, and marital status is seen to make them unworthy of
procreating." (p. 305) Thus, the larger threat is not only to poor Black
women, but also to all poor and marginalized women who live under a
regime that uses coercion and inducements to secure their "choice" not
to procreate. In sum, if an agenda of racial genocide lurks behind mod~
ern reproductive policies, Roberts has failed to uncover it.
While Roberts is no doubt sympathetic to the plight of poor women
in general, she is convinced that, when it comes to reproductive policies,
class and race are "inextricably linked." (p. 110) Her theory is that by
focusing myopically on the problem of Black welfare mothers, the media
have created a powerful image that drives decisions concerning repro~
ductive policies. She states: "The American public associates welfare
payments to single mothers with the mythical Black 'welfare queen,'
who deliberately becomes pregnant in order to increase the amount of
her monthly check. The welfare queen represents laziness, chicanery,
and economic burden all wrapped up in one powerful image:• (p. 111)
As a result, according to Roberts, "[w]hen Americans debate welfare
reform, most have single Black mothers in mind." (p. 110) The link
between race and welfare is firmly implanted in the American mind.
More importantly, as Roberts also notes, welfare policies will always
disproportionately affect Black women, since as a percentage of the
population more Black women than white women rely on public assis~
tance. Whether or not restrictive laws and proposals concerning welfare
14 On

several occasions, Roberts references Carrie Buck, the "feebleminded" white girl
whose forced sterilization spawned the now-infamous declaration by Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes that "[t]hree generations of imbeciles are enough." Buck v. Bell, 274
u.s. 200, 207 (1927).
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and reproduction are overtly or covertly targeted at Black women, these
women will disproportionately bear the burdens and suffer the consequences of their enactment.
Roberts is correct that these pernicious images have affected our
country's debates concerning welfare, reproduction and criminal justice.
On a more tangible level, some evidence exists that these images also
affect the solutions that are proposed for perceived problems. Unfortunately, Roberts does not allow her evidence simply to speak for itself.
Roberts possesses the evidence to show convincingly that certain facially
neutral proposals and laws do not have neutral effects. 15 Admittedly, an
approach that focuses on disproportionate impact rather than intentional
bias turns a dimmer spotlight on the plight of Black women. Nevertheless, sufficient evidence exists to alert us to racial bias.
Roberts's chapter on criminal justice and reproduction, which is the
most provocative chapter in her book, is a good example. Roberts notes
that growing numbers of women have been indicted after giving birth to
babies who test positive for drugs, particularly crack cocaine. Roberts
charges that prosecutors have indicted these women not to protect their
fetuses, but "as a way of punishing Black women for having babies."
(p. 154) After all, Roberts points out, the crime hinges not on the use
of drugs but rather on the decision to have a baby. A woman who
chooses to have an abortion in such circumstances can avoid prosecution
altogether. According to Roberts, media sensationalism in the late 1980s
and early 1990s of a "crack baby" epidemic "indelibly etched in the
American psyche" (p. 159) the image of a Black mother incapable of
caring for her child. 16 Roberts states that "[t]he monstrous crack-smoking mother was added to the iconography of depraved Black maternity,
alongside the matriarch and the welfare queen. Crack gave society one
more reason to curb Black women's fertility." (p. 157) Roberts charges
that white prosecutors and judges, swept up in this media hype, launched
an assault that has resulted in the "punishment of poor Black women
who fail to meet the middle-class ideal of motherhood." (p. 179) Roberts
believes that these prosecutors and judges literally "invented the crime
of prenatal drug use in the 1980s in order to castigate poor Black
mothers who smoke crack." (p. 187)
It is true that the wealth of evidence regarding maternal and child
health conditions in the United States has been ignored in favor of a
bizarre and inappropriate obsession with drug use by pregnant women.
The focus on pregnant drug users seems quite hypocritical considering
15 See

Ruth Colker, An Equal Protection Analysis of United States Reproductive Health
Policy: Gender, Race, Age, and Class, 1991 DUKE L.J. 324, 329, 362.
16 In Roberts's view, the media exaggerated the harmful effect of crack use on children.
She states: "The data on the extent and severity of crack's impact on babies are highly
controversial, to say the least." (p. 157)
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the fact that many women use tobacco and alcohol during pregnancy,
substances that can be just as harmful to the fetus. Yet society apparently
accepts this maternal behavior much more readily. There have been two
responses to the issue of maternal drug abuse, both punitive. The overtly
punitive response, and the one that Roberts focuses on in her book, is
seen in the criminal prosecution of pregnant substance abusers on charges
ranging from delivering drugs to a minor to manslaughter or assault with
a deadly weapon. 17 The second response to this problem, to which Roberts
pays scant attention but which affects many more lives than will ever be
reached through criminal prosecution, has been increased vigilance in
the enforcement of civil child abuse and neglect laws against pregnant
users of controlled substances.
These punitive responses demonstrate the validity of two important
points that Roberts raises. The first point is that an approach to the
problems of infant morbidity and mortality that focuses on maternal drug
abuse will result in a disproportionate number of Black women being
prosecuted for child abuse. Whether intended or not, the number of
Black mothers who will be reported to authorities for suspected drug
abuse will be substantially higher than the number of white mothers.
Black women's disproportionate use of public hospitals and their more
frequent contacts with government agencies will ensure that authorities
are notified of their crimes, as will a myopic focus on crack abuse as
opposed to other harmful drugs. 18 Indeed, as Roberts notes, the evidence
shows that despite relatively equal rates of drug use, Black women are
nearly ten times more likely than white women to be reported to state
agencies for substance abuse during pregnancy. 19 (p. 175) Since none of
the reporting laws passed in response to the problem of maternal drug
abuse differentiate among the various illicit substances, marijuana users
should not be treated differently than cocaine users. The relatively equal
extent of drug use among Black and white women should generate equal
numbers of reports to state agencies. The fact that the numbers are
nowhere close to equal is evidence of race bias in reporting.
The punitive response to maternal drug abuse also demonstrates the
validity of a second point Roberts makes-that negative liberty simply
17 This

practice has been criticized on both legal and policy grounds as being unconsti·
tutionally discriminatory and unlikely to deter substance abuse by pregnant users. See,
e.g., Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN's L.J. 278
(1990).
18 Roberts charges that "targeting crack use during pregnancy unfairly singles out
Black women for punishment." (p. 178)
19 See also Ira J. Chasnoff et al., The Prevalence of Illicit-Drug or Alcohol Use During
Pregnancy and Discrepancies in Mandatory Reporting in Pinellas County, Florida, 322
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1204 (1990) (stating that in Pinellas County a black woman is 9.6
times more likely than a white woman to be reported for substance abuse during
pregnancy).
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is not a sufficient response to the inequality that poor Black women
continue to experience. Randall Kennedy, among others, has argued that
criminal prosecutions of mothers who abuse drugs are a positive step
toward achieving protection of Black children in the criminal justice
system.2 Kennedy agrees that Black women are prosecuted in such cases
in disproportionately high numbers, but notes that if white mothers were
disproportionately prosecuted for such crimes, it would be taken as proof
that prosecutors care more about white babies than Black babies. Roberts
disagrees that this prosecutorial focus is a positive development for
Black mothers and children. Roberts has difficulty accepting that prosecutors and judges are acting in the best interest of Black children, given
the historical use of criminal laws to subjugate Blacks. Women faced
with the prospect that their disclosure of drug abuse to a physician will
trigger a state child abuse and neglect reporting statute will hide their
addictions or, worse, fail to seek prenatal treatment at all. Roberts correctly challenges the notion that putting mothers in jail will somehow
lead to healthy children. Rather than punishing these women, Roberts
believes that resources should be devoted to ending women's drug abuse
before they become pregnant. That is a proposal that can be readily
supported regardless of racial predicate or evidence of invidious discrimination.
Like criminal penalties, family cap laws that deny benefits to women
who have a threshold number of children and proposals for coercing
women to use contraception by limiting or denying subsistence benefits
altogether are poor solutions to such social problems. These laws, which
affect all poor women but affect Black women disproportionately, are a
desperate response to a seemingly unending cycle of dependence. In
their desperation, however, lawmakers have opted for a quick fix rather
than a long-term solution. Autonomy requires a wide array of social
supports that guarantee preconditions for self-realization such as shelter,
food, day care, health care and education. Autonomy presumes the availability to each person of meaningful work and relationships as well as
the opportunity for political, social and cultural engagement. In short,
autonomy requires the equality promised by positive liberty.
While Roberts's notion of positive liberty generally portends well for
poor women of all races, in a sense the concept of liberty as Roberts
has constructed it may ultimately curtail reproductive freedom for some
women. This negative aspect of Roberts's positive liberty comes through
in her chapter entitled "Race and the New Reproduction," which examines new reproductive technologies, including surrogacy and in vitro
fertilization. This chapter is a rather curious exception to the other

°

20 See

Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1255 (1994).
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chapters of the book. Here there is no forcible contraception, no
degrading formal sterilization or any other sort of government-mandated or privately supported curtailment of Black fertility. The new
technology is not being used to restrict the liberty of Black women; in
fact, its sole purpose is to expand the reproductive options available to
women.
Roberts's interest in these new technologies and practices is driven
not by her interest in reproduction in general, but rather by her "interest
in the devaluation of Black reproduction." (p. 246) According to Roberts,
just as policies that prevent births are shaped by race, so too are policies
that assist births. That is so, according to Roberts, because these new
technologies are "used almost exclusively by white people." (p. 251)
Roberts worries that "[b]y strengthening the ideology that white people
deserve to procreate while Black people do not, the new reproduction
may worsen racial inequality." (p. 283) She sees in these scientific
advances the ghost of "positive eugenics"-the notion that by increasing
the number of births from "superior" parents, one can somehow improve
society. (p. 283) Roberts readily acknowledges that the racial disparity
in the use of new technologies "will hardly alter the demographic composition of the country." (p. 283) She also acknowledges that the market
(infertile couples pay $8,000 to $20,000 for each pregnancy attempt, p.
253) and cultural differences (Roberts notes that even wealthy Black
couples generally eschew these technologies, p. 259), not any overt or
covert racism, appear to drive the availability and use of the new technology. The harm she sees is ideological in nature-the disproportionate
use of new technologies by whites, according to Roberts, sends the
message that the relative value of Blacks is less than the relative value
of whites in America.
Apparently, not every woman's personhood and choice and self-determination merit protection and facilitation under Roberts's view of "reproductive justice." (p. 311) Indeed, Roberts seems untroubled by the
conclusion that balancing the scales of "social justice" might require that
the government restrict the availability of certain new reproductive technologies to white (and other) couples who can afford them. (p. 297) In
other words, if some women stand to lose access to reproductive technologies that advance their autonomy, so be it. As she sees it, the value
in these technologies lies in their "subversive potential" (p. 248)-their
ability to help single women, lesbians and gay men circumvent legal
barriers to parenthood. Roberts is disappointed that "[m]ost often they
complete a traditional nuclear family by providing a married couple with
a child." (p. 248) Whatever her view of the value of the new technologies, Roberts does not say how depriving some women of an aspect of
their reproductive freedom advances the cause of poor Black women.
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Are they likely to feel that their children are somehow more valued if a
more affluent couple is prohibited from conceiving a child?21
In the end, Roberts wants race to take "center stage" in our deliberations about reproductive health policy. (p. 311) Her "new race consciousness" (p. 311) highlights the radically different experiences of the races
where reproductive freedom is concerned and heightens our awareness
of what it truly means to have reproductive choices. Roberts convincingly demonstrates that Black women have disproportionately suffered
the effects of restrictive reproductive policies. Race surely has a place
on the stage along with poverty and marital status, but as our history so
ably demonstrates, making it the centerpiece of a concept of "reproductive justice" (p. 311) can be dangerous. The numerous injustices Black
women have suffered should not be used to justify the subordination of
other women's reproductive autonomy. The true test for Roberts's notion
of positive liberty is whether it is strong enough to lift poor women of
all races to autonomy without sacrificing other women's reproductive
freedom.
-Timothy Zick

21 Roberts dismisses barriers to transracial adoptions by claiming that white couples
only seek to adopt as a "second-best alternative." (p. 272) Even when they do adopt,
Roberts claims that they prefer white children. (p. 273)

